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Abstract 
This thesis is an analysis of public policies based on the research carried out about the implementation of 
RASDA Program (local rice husbandry) in Kulonprogo in 2015. It is claimed as a new alternative offered to 
replace the Government RASKIN Program that is already running. This research aimed in determining how 
effective the implementation of the RASDA Program in Kulonprogo was and identifying the factors that 
cause RASDA program did not run as the expectation. The method used in this study was a qualitative meth-
od using two types of data, primary and secondary data. The data collection techniques used were observa-
tion, interview, and documentation with informants selection technique using the principle of purposive and 
snowball techniques. The data analysis technique was done through data reduction, data display, and data 
verification.  
The results showed that efforts to renew the RASKIN Program (cheap-priced rice) through RASDA program 
were not successfully done. The achievement of program outputs and outcome indicators were still far away 
from the expectation. The progress was not significantly improved, it still encountered the same problems as 
those in the implementation of the previous RASKIN Program. Meanwhile, farmers did not have any benefits 
from the uptake of the local rice because it was not optimally prepared. 
There are several factors that cause RASDA Program in Kulonprogro did not run well. The first reason was 
that it is difficult to link the concept of the program with the actual situation, seen from: (1) the farmers as 
the program target still thought conservatively causing the loss of the benefits that will be gained from the 
RASDA Program; (2) the intervention of political elites in the process of policy formulation; (3) the limited 
authority of the local government in the National RASKIN Program; and (4) the incoherency among the 
needs for resources in the factual conditions. The second cause, the conflict of interest among the holders 
cause the program implementation did not synchronize to each other, as seen from: (1) their efforts to make 
RASDA program as a springboard for “other” purposes; (2) the bias support of BULOG; (3) the lack of 
enthusiasm and initiatives among the holders/bureaucracy; and (4) the entrepreneurs’ mindset of business 
that dominated farmers community. The third reason is that there was not awareness on the characteristics 
of the group target to anticipate problems that arise.  
Based on these findings, the researcher suggested the government to focus in optimizing the current mecha-
nisms of the food subsidies. The government should also concern in looking for other alternatives to opti-
mize the potential of the local foods. The government should also  do some efforts to gain the welfare for 
farmers, by: (1) reconstructing values and norms in terms of social rules to support the program with the 
intensive socialization; (2) allocating the budget the APBD for the procurement of subsidized rice for poor 
households who are not registered; (3) monitoring the program up to the lowest level intensively; (4) en-
couraging small entrepreneurs to become BULOG’s partners to seek an access to the Capital; (5) maintain-
ing fair competition among rice traders; (6) conducting studies on the possibility of establishing a integrat-
ed rice husbandry regional company; (7) encouraging the local rice branding. 
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INTRODUCTION  
This study analyzes the implementation of 
the RASDA program in the district of Kulonpro-
go, Yogyakarta. This program is a new design 
offered by the government in its food aid system 
for the low-income communities through 
RASKIN Program. The research focused on 
finding the factors that cause RASDA program 
in the district of Kulonprogo did not run as the 
expectation. It was conducted by evaluating the 
implementation of the program. The key issue 
background of this research is that there were not 
so many problems solved in the implementation 
RASKIN Program. During couples of year of 
RASKIN program implementation, the success 
of the program is difficult to be reached. There 
were so many complicated regulations that re-
sulted inefficiency of the program.  
Research results of SMERU Research In-
stitute (2012) concluded that there were still 
many shortcomings of the RASKIN program. It 
refflected that 6T’s benchmark indicators perfor-
mance of the program's success had not been 
achieved yet. Meanwhile, the Corruption Eradi-
cation Commission (KPK, 2013) also submitted 
the suspected institutions related to this RASKIN 
Program. KPK considered this subsidy program 
cannot meet 6T as an indicator of the effective-
ness of the program. There were problems relat-
ed to the lack of monitoring and control system, 
which then concluded the inefficiency in the on-
going RASKIN program. Therefore it is neces-
sary to reconstruct the program 
(www.kpk.go.id). BPS-Statistic Indonesia’s data 
shows that the number of RASKIN program tar-
gets had not reduced significantly from the be-
ginning of the program implementation (15.16 
million in 2002) until today (15.53 million in 
2014). SUSENAS’ first quarter of 2013 showed 
that the rice subsidy in RASKIN program was 
benefited by 31.23 million households (RT) from 
15.5 million registered RTS-PM (Head of BPS, 
Suryamin, in Jakarta, Thursday, January 2nd 
2014. Source: www.merdeka.com). 
The problem in RASKIN program is the 
raise of issues related to the continuity of the 
program. At the end, the government decided to 
continue the cheap rice program which was in-
tended to help the poor (Raskin) while looking 
for other alternative policies, including the alter-
native to make RASDA as a new design of the 
RASKIN program. Redesign RASKIN program 
is a part of government efforts in formulating 
effective and efficient policies for the society.  
The problems arising in the RASKIN im-
plementation implicated an irrelevancy of the 
government's agenda in addressing existing pub-
lic problems. Therefore, it is important then to 
find other alternative policies to address the ex-
isting problems. RASDA program, which was 
initiated in the district of Kulonprogo, became 
one of the new alternatives of RASKIN program. 
It was also the answer to the solution for various 
problems found in RASKIN program that had 
been running. Replacing the RASKIN program 
with the RASDA Program means modifying the 
system that the procurement of rice is supplied 
by local farmers through Gapoktan (rice farmers 
community). 
The RASDA Program ultimately is consid-
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ered as a flagship program to improve the long-
standing RASKIN program. The policy of de-
centralization allows the government at the low-
est level can take the right decision in accord-
ance with actual conditions in each area. In 
RASDA Program implementation, the data va-
lidity at the village level is the key to overcome 
the lack of valid data problems. RASDA pro-
gram also allows people who are not registered 
in the RTS-PM, but in the actual condition are 
worthy to receive can be covered. Supplying rice 
from the local farmers guarantees RTS-PMs re-
ceive rice in much better quality than the old 
stock of rice distributed from the unreliable 
sources or even imported from abroad. The dis-
tance between the upstream and downstream is a 
closer making distribution cost can be reduced. 
The distance proximity also leads the rice distri-
bution time more efficient. 
However, as the time goes on, its imple-
mentation earns another problem. Gapoktan can-
not supply the amount of the rice required to 
support RASDA program. It is only about 46.5% 
of the requirement can be fulfilled. Besides, 
there are concerns related to the quality and the 
origin of rice supplied by the Gapoktan, such as 
the compliance of the rice program for civil serv-
ants in Kulonprogo regency. In 2015, RASKIN 
Coordination Team and the District Social Wel-
fare Workers find at least 20% of rice that were 
distributed to the public in several districts in 
Kulonprogo is still unclean and crumble 
(tribun.news.com, 04.09.2015). Several chal-
lenges are also faced with the problem of the de-
creasing of agricultural lands, crop pests that of-
ten attack, and the unstable climate. The down-
ward trend in the number of agricultural produc-
tion especially rice occurs from year to year and 
it has no solution yet. 
Departing from the background of the 
above problems, the main question that becomes 
the formulation of the problem in this research is 
"Why is RASDA Program in Kulonprogo still 
not optimal?”. The question, in advance, is then 
broken down into more specific questions; "How 
is the implementation of RASDA program in 
Kulonprogo regency?”, and "What are the fac-
tors causing RASDA Program in Kulonprogo 
not optimal? 
James E. Anderson (2003: 3), says that a 
relative stable and a purposive course of an ac-
tion followed by actors in dealing with a matter 
of concern, where the policy cannot be separated 
from the roles of the actors who define and im-
plement policies to overcome the problems 
faced. Thomas R. Dye (1972: 1), defines public 
policy as whatever government choose to do or 
not to do. It means that whatever the govern-
ment’s decicion can be regarded as a public poli-
cy. Meanwhile, David Easton (1953, in Dye, 
1972: 1) defines public policy as the authorita-
tive implementation of values for the whole soci-
ety. Furthermore, the government’s decisions 
will finally result in the implementation of the 
values. From the description above, it can be said 
that the public policy is a decision or an action 
taken by the government in achieving particular 
objectives through the implementation of values 
to the society by utilizing existing resources. The 
elements of public policy established a relation-
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ship of mutual influence to each other. 
According to Grindle (1980: 6), the imple-
mentation of the policy is to establish a relation-
ship that leads the realization of the policy goals 
as a result of government activity (establish a 
link that allows goals of public policies to be role 
models as outcomes of governmental activity). 
Purwanto and Sulistyastuti (2012:21) say that the 
point is how the implementation of the policy 
outputs conducted by the executor to the group 
targets to be good in an effort to actualize the 
policies. 
The implementation process departs from 
the existence of a program that has a specific 
purpose. To achieve these objectives, it is re-
quired policy inputs that will be processed into 
policy outputs through the activities to the group 
targets. When the policy outputs have been de-
livered to the group targets, it can be said that the 
policy has led to an initial policy effect or out-
come, namely an immediate effect. The next 
stage is exploring the policy outputs to produce 
final policy outcomes. If the policy outcomes are 
able to reach the objectives of the policy, it can 
be claimed that the policy outcomes are high-
performance implementations of policies. 
Policy performance indicators are meas-
ured using measurement instruments. Purwanto 
and Sulistyastuti (2012:105) divide the main in-
dicators of the performance implementation 
measurement of the policy into two, namely: 1) 
output indicators, to determine the direct conse-
quences that are felt; and 2) outcome indicators, 
which are used to assess outcomes (impacts) on 
the implementation of the policy. A logical 
framework performance measurement of the pol-
icy implementation according to Cole and 
Parston (2006) as cited Purwanto and Sulistastuti 
(2012: 100) can be seen in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Logical framework performance measurement of the policy implementation 
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Some experts emphasize some of the fac-
tors that affect the implementation of the policy 
in a various variables (table 1).   
Conceptualization of the RASDA Program 
in Kulonprogo was carried out by combining the 
concepts of experts who believe that characteris-
tics of the policies were the object of research. 
There are three main focuses of this study related 
to the implementation of the policy. They are 
integrated in three different dimensions and can-
not be separated from the characteristics of the 
environment where this policy was implemented. 
On the dimension of the new policy con-
cept, the important thing is how the concept of 
the policies can be so implemented in accord-
ance with the context of the implementation that 
the scheme prepared run as it is expected previ-
ously. Meanwhile, the dimension of the execu-
tors concerns the relationship among the execu-
tive actors RASDA Program in Kulonprogo 
which have characteristics and interests of each. 
In advance, in the dimensions of the group tar-
gets, the authors focus on trends in the behavior 
performed by the group targets as a part of envi-
ronmental policy influences on the process and 




The method in this research was the quali-
tative descriptive method complemented by an 
analysis of secondary data. The research was 
conducted in the district of Kulonprogo, Yogya-
karta, from November 2015 through to January 
2016. Meanwhile, RASDA program in the dis-
trict of Kulonprogo has been running since Janu-
ary 2014.  
Experts Factors 




Merilee S Grindle Policy content 
Implementation environment 
Daniel A Mazmanian 
and Sabatier 
Characteristics of the problem 
Characteristics of the policy 
Environment Variables 
Donald S Van Meter and 
Carl E. Van Horn 
Policy standards and targets 
Resources 
Communication among the related organizations 
Characteristics of the holder agencies 
The political, social,l and economic situations 
The executor disposition 
G Shabbir Cheema and 
Dennis A Rondinelli 
Environmental conditions 
The relationship between organizations 
Resources in the organization for policy implementation 
The characteristics and capabilities of the holder agencies 
David L Weimer and 
Aidan R Vining 
The scheme of the policy 
The environment where the policy implemented 
The capability of the apolicy executors 
Table 1. Factors That Influence the Policy Implementation 
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The data used were the combination of 
both primary data directly obtained from the 
field through direct observations, depth inter-
views, and secondary data obtained from the 
documents. The collection of data from the data 
source was conducted by involving the tech-
niques of the direct observation, the interview 
and the documentation. To ensure the validity of 
the data, the researcher tested the validity using 
triangulation techniques. In processing and ana-
lyzing the data, the authors applied an interactive 
analysis consisting of data reduction, data dis-
play, and data verification.  
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The integration between RASDA and 
RASKIN in Kulonprogo 
The implementation of RASDA program is 
not much different from RASKIN program that 
is already running. The concept that had been 
designed for RASDA program has not been fully 
implemented. The fact shows that RASDA pro-
gram is only  a matter of alteration term from 
RASKIN program because the rice procurement 
that should be through Gapoktan has not been 
fully implemented. 
The RASDA program leads the new exec-
utor as a supplier of rice called the local Gapok-
tan. InProSuLa (Institute for Promoting Sustain-
able Livelihood Approach) takes a major role in 
the design, the initiation, and the assistance in 
the implementation of the program. Those stages 
will be then measured by the government. The 
opportunity for public participation in the devel-
opment process is a manifestation of a good gov-
ernance. RASDA program gave a wide chance 
Figure 2: Framework Research 
Source:  Researcher identification 
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for the public society in the procurement of rice 
as well as in its distribution. The civil society, 
private institutions, and the government are all 
responsible for the RASDA program with the 
duties and the functions of each. 
 
Rice Procurement of RASDA program 
There were only about seventeen gapok-
tans which were qualified to be involved from 
eighty-eight gapoktans. The government of Ku-
lonprogo regency used the supply capacity of 
each gapoktan as the standard supply quota. The 
capacity of a gapoktan depens on the capability 
and the experience of the trader inside of it. This 
statement comes from a fact that actually the 
warehouse, the steamroller, and the means of 
transportation belong to the trader inside of the 
gapoktan. As the effect, the benefits of the rice 
procurement in RASDA program are mostly tak-
en by the trader itself. Meanwhile, the gapoktan 
get only a few of it. 
From eight gapoktans that are recommend-
ed to BULOG, thera are only six gapoktans that 
are active as suppliers. Meanwhile, the two other 
gapoktans do not supply the rice to BULOG. 
From the six gapoktans, there are apparently on-
ly three gapoktans which meet the target quota. 
However, the overall target quota can be 
achieved.  
The low HPP rice makes it difficult to get 
the rice or grain from local farmers. This situa-
tion may override the priority to absorb the rice 
from the local farmers. gapoktans would not buy 
at a lower price than HPP to keep the margin re-
mains profitable. 
Farmers have the authority to determine 
when and where they will sell their agricultural 
products. It can be both to gapoktans directly 
(trader in), to resellers or other smaller business-
es, and to other BULOG’s partners. The traders 
inside the gapoktans do not only buy the rice 
from the local farmers but also from outside the 
farmers’ area through second suppliers 
(resellers). Finally, the rice coming into BULOG 
for RASDA Program in Kulonprogo are not only 
the local rice. It can be either from gapoktans 
procurement or other partners, and even also 
from outside the area. 
 
Rice Distribution of RASDA program 
The RASKIN technical rules that made by 
RASKIN Regency Coordination Team was not 
specific in anticipating the problems that may 
occur. They only regulated normative rules relat-
ed to the distribution of rice subsidies and the 
indicators used to measure the success of the 
program. The initialization of the RASKIN pro-
gram implementation was conducted in the be-
ginning of every year by inviting relevant stake-
holders. 
The amount of the quota was based on the 
List of Beneficiaries (DPM). The data source 
was from the integrated database for social pro-
tection programs taken from the Social Protec-
tion Registration Program (PPLS) 2011 under 
the instituion of BPS managed by TNP2K. The 
data of RTS-PM are collected from the integrat-
ed database to the central government through 
Rahman Asjhatri Fandaru -- A New Design of Raskin Program ... 
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the Secretariat TNP2K. The reconstruction of the 
mechanism is done in several stages, starting 
from the village through the discussion in a local 
meeting until the final decision in the central 
government. The mechanism of the data updat-
ing that have to pass many stages was considered 
ineffective and inefficient. 
TD rice distribution should be carried out 
monthly according to the prepared schedule be-
fore totaling eighty eight points. Each village in 
a district should receive rice on the same day as 
the distribution day. Unfortunately, until 2015 
the real condition had not met the expectation 
yet. This is a result of the existing policy in 
which the RTS membership was driven by the 
sense of community and camaraderie in one en-
vironment. It also caused the emergence of jeal-
ousy of the society who was not registered be-
cause of the abstract policy. 
The implementation of the Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) Program is conducted period-
ically afterward. M&E aims in improving the 
effectiveness of the distribution of RASKIN con-
ducted by networks through coordinating TKPK, 
covering the actual distribution, identifying prob-
lems, and making efforts to solve problems. The 
evaluations were conducted through a coordina-
tion held at the end of the program year. The re-
portswere established periodically arranged ac-
cording to the structural levels of the teamwork. 
Each RTS-PM pays 24,000 rupiahs for one 
sack weighing 15 kilograms in TD each month. 
RTS-PM collectively also pays for the transpor-
tation cost. The mechanism used was a direct 
payment through BULOG officials who come 
directly to any distribution spot of the rice. 
Figure 3. RASDA Program Performance 
      Source: Researcher identification 
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Evaluation of the Program Achievement Indi-
cators 
RASDA Program shows the achievement 
indicators can be seen in Figure 4. The achieve-
ment of the outputs and the initial outcomes of 
RASDA program has not been optimal yet. The 
donation program in achieving the intermediate 
outcome is not very well conducted. It impacts 
on the RASDA implementation that has not been 
sufficient to improve the welfare of farmers and 
to optimize the most appropriate potential of the 
local foods in Kulonprogo.  It still cannot be 
seen the positive impact of the policies imple-
mentation to the national economy development 
in general, and to local village economy in par-
ticular. 
Based on the facts on the field, the out-
comes of the RASDA Program implementation 
in 2015 are as described in Figure 3.  
 
Factors That Cause RASDA not Optimal 
Conflict between Concept Design and Reality 
In RASDA program, emerging constraints 
resulted by the scheme of the concept design this 
new program are not solved optimally. It the 
causes a collision between the concept design of 
the program and the reality on the ground. 
The scheme of RASDA program concept 
was missed so it could not run optimally. Prob-
lems arise when the rice used for this RASKIN 
was actually purchased at a price that is likely to 
Rahman Asjhatri Fandaru -- A New Design of Raskin Program ... 
Figure 4.  Objectives of RASDA Program Achievement Indicators 
Source: Researcher identification 
OUTPUT 
 6 T fulfilled 
 Rice of local farmers absorbed 
maximally by Gapoktan 
INITIAL OUTCOME 
 Increasing the selling price of local 
rice 
 RASKIN program using local rice 
 Increasing community involvement 
LONG TERM OUTCOME 
 Developing rural economic, re-
gional and national 
INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME 
 Increasing farmer’s income 
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be low, using the benchmark Government Pur-
chase Price (HPP) that is always under the pre-
vailing market price. Furthermore, sadly the 
scheme to improve both the welfare of the farm-
ers and the use of local rice for RASKIN through 
BULOG was really difficult to achieve. It was 
actually caused bythe rationality of the farmers 
itself. The use of local rice to RASKIN program 
provides greater opportunities to farmers in get-
ting a lower price than they could get. As for the 
benefits, the design of RASDA concept is not 
much beneficial to the rice farmers. 
One of the major changes that are expected 
to work during the initial RASDA program de-
sign is an attempt to shift the role of BULOG as 
both the provider and the distributor of rice for 
RASKIN program. Meanwhile, there are many 
interests that underlie the implementation 
RASKIN program. Therefore, it will be so diffi-
cult to do a major change. Blaming groups that 
take advantage from the imports is not that easy. 
They will not be willing to lose "field" anyway. 
It also needs to consider the the BULOG re-
sistance which can be attack by the multi-billion 
fund company, which has the potential to con-
tribute a great advantage for the company itself. 
Kulonprogo government partnering with 
Yogyakarta BULOG Regional Division, which 
was also located at the same provincial level, 
oversees the entire territory of Yogyakarta Prov-
ince Government. In this case, the level of deci-
sion-making are not aligned to each other. Mean-
while, Yogyakarta Regional Division has a lim-
ited authority. It have to follow also with the pol-
icies of the central government. This subsidy 
budget management became the BULOG’s au-
thority completely. The local government could 
not interfere in the BULOG’s internal policies. 
Thus, in this case the government Kulonprogo 
regency also could not do much in making deci-
sions such as: the purchase price of rice, the 
amount of the subsidy, the origin of the rice, and 
the policies related to the management of both 
pre and post purchase rice distribution. 
The problems arise concerning the readi-
ness of the society and gapoktan  were involved 
to implement the delegation of tasks that have 
been performed by Perum BULOG. It requires 
expertise and adequate infrastructure support as 
already been owned by Perum BULOG previ-
ously. Here are still a lot of things to be prepared 
to get start to the all BULOG tasks as mentioned 
above. It may be ranging from improving the 
quality of human resources and Gapoktan mem-
bers, providing standards-compliant warehouse, 
providing means of transportation, and the like. 
However, it still needs further study on the effec-
tiveness and efficiency to successfully achieve 
the objectives. 
 
Conflict of Interest in the Implementer Dispo-
sition 
The main objective of the initial concept of 
RASDA Program (version of InProSuLa) is to 
reduce the BULOG’s roles and to encourage the 
regency government’s. The re-design of 
RASKIN program into RASDA program is a 
part of their struggle to take the next step, where 
there are many other plans that will be carried 
out afterwards. 
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BULOG tends to have a refusal mainly due 
to the issue that its role as a provider of RASKIN 
rice is likely to be omitted. This trend is visible 
from a BULOG’s effort to counter attack by 
blaming groups who want to shift the third 
BULOG’s functions, either openly or not. Cur-
rently, BULOG faces pressures from the public 
related to the execution of their duties. 
BULOG then makes some efforts to main-
tain its functions that are rational for a company. 
They give the potential benefits greatly from the 
needs of the national RASKIN rice reaching 
more than 232.963 tones (regular quota in 2015). 
BULOG absolutely do not want to lose a source 
of huge profits for his company. It is also due to 
the political reasons. However, the pressures 
faced by BULOG leads a positive effect on the 
improvement of the BULOG performance in his 
role as the executor of the RASKIN rice distribu-
tion. 
In the implementation of the RASDA pro-
gram, the regency government cannot work 
alone. It really needs a commitment and a seri-
ous work of SKPD (units of work) under its con-
troll to implement the program. SKPD has a di-
verse disposition in this Program. Not all of the 
agencies are working well, as well as the institu-
tion under the regency government. They are ac-
tually trying to support the Regent policies, none 
of them can really meet to the objectives that 
want to be achieved. The position of the govern-
ment in the implementation of RASDA tends to 
be both vary and unclear. This means that they 
are in a position which is not completely sup-
porting to success the RASDA program. Howev-
er, they also do not completely resist the imple-
mentation of the program. 
Disposition of Gapoktan here will not be 
far from the business scheme as part of the eco-
nomic motives in order to seek profits. Employ-
ers will try to maximize profit-making that is 
obtained, because a reason of either the conven-
ience gained through the facilities by the govern-
ment or the different profit margin between the 
purchase and sale prices. In order to get the max-
imum benefit, employers also will not emphasize 
the origin of the rice bought. As long as thay can 
save the maximum benefits, the rice coming 
from outside area is not a problem for them. The 
conflicts of interest in optimizing local rice is 
searching the maximum benefit. 
Furthermore, norms have become one part 
of social rules, where mostly people in Kulon-
progo live in rural area dominated by the Java-
nese and some still hold a principe of modesty. 
There are some people who tend to be fearer of 
social sanction thay may be received in a com-
munity where they lives rather than of the provi-
sions in force (in the RASKIN program) that 
have unclear sanctions for them. The closeness 
between the client and the street-level bureau-
crats in term of informal relationships and norms 
in a traditional society is still strong. The situa-
tion impacts on the raises of the findings of the 
irregularities that occurred in the RASDA imple-
mentation. There is a tendency to negotiate the 
sanctions between the target groups as clients 
with vanguard bureaucrats that have a close rela-
tionship informally. 
 
Rahman Asjhatri Fandaru -- A New Design of Raskin Program ... 
 79 
 
Copyright © 2016, JKAP, p-ISSN  0852-9213, e-ISSN 2477-4693   
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the findings on the field as it has 
been described in previous chapters, it can be 
concluded as follows: 
1. The achievement indicator of the program in 
case of the re-design efforts from RASKIN 
program to RASDA program is still not com-
pletely successful. 
2. There are several factors that cause RASDA 
Program in Kulon Progo failed to be imple-
mented successfully, namely: 
a. The conflict of the concept design of the 
program with the existing realities results 
some difficulties to actualize the concept 
design itself. It is seen from (1). Their ra-
tionality as program targets farmers was 
beaten by the possibility of the benefits 
that will be gained; (2). The intervention 
of complicated interests from political 
elites in the process of the policy formula-
tion; (3). The limitations of the decision-
making authority of local government in 
the National RASKIN Program; and (4). 
The gap between the resources capability 
in the draft and in the factual conditions. 
b. The existence of a conflict of interest in 
the disposition of the lead implementer of 
each program managers tends to walk on 
their own and less synergistic. It is seen 
from (1) there are suspected efforts to 
make the RASDA program as a spring-
board to achieve other objectives; (2) the 
apparent support of BULOG; (3) the lack 
of enthusiasm and initiatives among the 
holders/bureaucracy; and (4) the business 
mindset that dominates entrepreneurs in 
Gapoktan.  
c. The target groups that as a part of the en-
vironment program has not received a suf-
ficient attention as a support in overcom-
ing problems that arise. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
From the research, it can be seen that there 
are many weaknesses in the concept design in 
the beginning of RASDA program that eventual-
ly lead to major challenges in its implementation. 
There will a lot of energy to spend if the govern-
ment of Kulonprogo Regency is still targeting to 
implement the program fully. Related to that sit-
uation, the advices that can be offered by the 
writer are first, focusing only on improving the 
implementation of RASKIN that has been under-
way. The second, it is looking for other alterna-
tives as efforts to optimize the potential of the 
local food to increase the welfare of society in 
general and of the farmers or rice producers in 
particular. Meanwhile, a positive steps has been 
achieved through an MoU with BULOG to con-
tinuously maximize the Gapoktan role as a sup-
plier of rice to BULOG. 
The findings on the field in the previous 
description show that the problems arising from 
the implementation of the RASKIN program 
(case in Kulonprogo) actually come from dy-
namic changes that occur in the implementation 
of the program. This situation comes form both 
the implemented program by the government or 
BULOG, and the behavior the people at the 
grassroots level. Moreover, the efforts to im-
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prove the performance of RASKIN program can 
be statrted from maximizing the system that has 
been formed previously to get the 6T indicators. 
It can be indicated by seriously overcoming de-
viations that occur. This is where the signifi-
cance of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting 
are carried out with seriousness in accordance 
with the real problems that occur in the field. As 
an evaluation of improvement, it also includes 
how to prepare both the operational and tech-
nical guidelines to both prevent and solve the 
problems. It is related to how to completely min-
imize the potential irregularities as a referral ex-
ecutor underneath. 
If is proven that the indicators that often 
lead to the achievement of 6T indicator are not 
achieved. One of those is the practice of the dis-
tribution of rice to be targeted. There are some 
things you can do to minimize the deviations ef-
fect. One of them is holding a socialization to the 
lowest level society to enlarge the mindset. One 
of the provision that should be believed is that 
RASKIN program implementation is not only 
about qualification along with the criteria but 
also about involving local public figures. They 
are expected to professionally controll the 
RASKIN program and no need to be reluctant if 
the share of the rice that is not right. It is quite 
difficult to change the mindset of people like 
this. However, it is not impossible to do because 
basically the traditional rural society tend to be 
more easily touched by using the sociological 
approach in the form of reconstruction of values 
and norms in society. This is an attempt to apply 
more effectively the social sanctions to support 
the achievement of program objectives. 
Moreover, one of the efforts to minimize 
the presence of nepotism practice is updating the 
data of RTS-PM to be more valid. Although the 
quota of rice recipents from the central govern-
ment is limited, at least the lower level govern-
ment should have a priority list of RTM condi-
tions that more accurate. In addition to get a bet-
ter program target accuracy, it is also important 
to avoid jealousy of RTMs which are not regis-
tered, which ae sometimes more appropriate for 
the subsidy. The writer also suggests the local 
governments to provide a budget allocation in 
the APBD to back up the subsidy of the rice pro-
curement to poor families who are not registered 
in the RASKIN rice recipents list from the cen-
tral government as a part of the social protection. 
Although the amount of the budget is a limited, 
this still may be done in the implementation of 
the budget allocation priority for the poors (pro-
poor). Absolutely it needs to prepare local 
regulations as a legal basis, including a regula-
tion to avoid the society’s dependency on the 
government assistance. 
Meanwhile, the controll of RASKIN rice 
quality has now become the BULOG’s authority. 
In addition to that authority, there has been no 
other parties that are more appropriate to replace 
the role. It is not only about the quality of the 
rice demanded, but also the guaranty of the stock 
availability on each quantum distribution of 
RASKIN. It  also deal with infrastructures sup-
porting the implementation of the program on a 
national scale. The main issue is only how to 
maximize the role of the society to monitor the 
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quality of the rice received by RTS-PM as a part 
of the control mechanisms of the RASKIN pro-
gram. It also needs to open widely a public com-
plaints channel and to hold a good coordination 
with BULOG. Those have been already done so 
far in Kulon Progo, but it still needs to be sup-
ported more frequently to controll up to the low-
est level. 
The involvement of the rice entrepreneurs 
in Gapoktan as BULOG's partner is an evidence 
to improve the RASKIN program both from the 
supply and the quality of the rice that can shift 
up the performance of BULOG itself. At least it 
becomes a positive step forward and it needs to 
be continued. Another positive step that should 
be taken is maximizing the market share of the 
potential demand of RASKIN rice program, ei-
ther for the enterpreneurs themselves or for Ku-
lonprogo regency. The rice entrepreneurs/traders 
in Gapoktan who become the BULOG partners 
will be able to cut the distribution chain affecting 
on the decrease of the rice price. This is because 
the employers in Gapoktan are generally small-to
-medium business actors which have more often 
become middlemen liaison between farmers and 
other partners. It is now just only about how the 
entrepreneurs in this Gapoktan can also be in-
strumental in the development of Gapoktan over-
ally. Moreover, the government can also seek 
how small-medium businesses that already exist 
can gain an access to the central government to 
develop their businesses and management skills 
in term of entrepreneurship to be better. 
The limitation in this study is on the analy-
sis of the RASDA program conducted. The re-
searchers here can only advise to do a study re-
lated to the possibility of establishing a regional 
company in the case of the rice management in-
tegrated to Kulonprogo government. It is based 
on the fact that the local rice in Kulonprogo is 
very potential considering the condition of the 
surplus is always achieved. Meanwhile, the sur-
plus has not been managed well to increase the 
welfare of the farmers. Furtermore, the farmers 
who have their own agricultural lands and prod-
ucts tend to have an inferior position. That is 
why, with a little government involvement in the 
downstream sector, it is expected to establish the 
standard quality and the price of rice openly to 
the public. It aims in avoiding the incoherent in-
formation to the farmers. It can also be a coun-
terweight to maintain a fair competition among 
existing entrepreneurs and also to encourage the 
establishment of a better price as well so that the 
farmers and the enterpreneurs are both likely to 
get benefits accordingly. A better management 
by the related parties can certainly increase the 
products value and expand the market access. 
Walking along with the widespread spirit 
of the movement Bela Beli Kulonprogo (shift up 
the local products), it is necessary to label up the 
local products including rice, to encourage the 
rice employers in Kulonprogo to do branding on 
the rice products. It is expected that in advance, 
the local products will be recognized by the soci-
ety well. The society will be able to identify 
which is the local product and which is not easi-
ly. As a result, people are involved much better 
in lifting local products. Of course, it is im-
portant to keep the quality and the price to main-
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tain the competitiveness of the products. The 
promotions can also be done by the local govern-
ment. Finally the most important is how the poli-
cies and programs drawn up are actually benefi-
cial for many people, especially for the target 
groups. It is not expected that the program is 
fruitful only for a few people on behalf of the 
public interests and efforts who try to take bene-
fits privately through the government policy. 
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